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Resource wealth in  Australia is often presented as an  asset, waiting to be 
exploited.  Reflecting  this,  the  recent  resource  boom  is  unquestioned -
indeed celebrated  - as a great windfall for the Australian people. There is 
a  broad-based  assumption  that  Australia's  resource-based  economy 
successfully diversified  in  the later twentieth  century, while  retaining a 
foundation  in  agricultural  exports,  and  latterly  minerals.  As  the  saying 
goes, the country rode to prosperity 'on  a sheep's back', and then on the 
back of the mining sector.  The recent  resources boom  may  be  seen  as 
simply  the  latest  phase  in  that  process,  pump-priming  the  country's 
twenty-first century information-age service economy. 
The mining boom  has undoubtedly been a key  foundation of Australia's 
recent economic growth. But how far should it be welcomed? This article 
debates the impact of the resource boom  in  Australia, arguing we should 
at  the very least be willing to discuss whether this presumed blessing is, 
for  many,  in  fact  a  'curse'  in  disguise.  In  the  context  of accelerated 
climate change, and a continuing rural crisis in  Australia, it  is salutary to 
be reminded of what  Sheik  Ahmed  Yamani,  long-time Oil  Minister of 
Saudi  Arabia, said  in  regard to their major resource asset:  'All in  all,  [ 
wish we had discovered water' (quoted in  Ross 1999). 
The  resources  curse  is  highly  revealing.  With  it,  the  internal 
contradictions  of  capitalist  development  are  laid  bare.  The  class 
contradiction,  a  labour-capital  antagonism  between  those  who  benefit 
from  and  those  bear  the  costs  of accumulation,  is  borne-out  in  sharp 
social  divisions  created  by  resource  extraction.  Spatial  antagonisms 
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pol itical tensions and confrontations, reflect underlying capital-to-capital 
contradictions.  Finally,  conflicts  over  ecological  sustainability  and 
survival  reflect  underlying  contradictions  between  nature  and  capital 
where resource extraction  literally erodes the sub-strata of accumulation. 
In  all  three dimensions the logic of resource extraction creates divisions 
and conflicts, and, especially in terms of  ecological impacts, is ultimately 
suicidal. 
The ensuing discussion begins by  outlining how the resource curse has 
been conceptualised intemationally. It then  moves to address Australian 
resource curses  in  terms of capital-labour contradictions as  reflected  in 
(i)  de-industrialisation  and  social  division,  (ii)  capital-capital 
contradictions as  played out  in  forms of regulatory capture and 'energy 
security',  and  (iii)  capital-nature  contradictions  in  terms  of ecological 
degradation and exhaustion. The analysis feeds into a wider comparative 
project centring on  Westem Australia and Alberta, Canada which has the 
objective of  outlining the dimensions of  the resource boom and its curses 
in  two similarly booming mining-dependent sub-national provinces. The 
intention  is  ultimately to  reframe the concept of the  resource curse as a 
tool  for analyzing multiple dimensions of dependency,  from  the local to 
the  global,  in  this  case  within  high-income  industrialized  resource 
economies (see Parkland Institute 2007). 
The Resource Curse 
The resource curse may  be defined as the socio-economic disadvantage, 
political  disruption  or  environmental  degradation  that  results  from 
dependence  on  extractive  industries.  The  phenomena  is  generally 
identified  as an  amiction  that  crosses  the  North  and  South,  but  most 
intense  debate  has  focused  on  experiences  of resource-dependent  low 
income  countries,  and  the  extent  to  which  dependence  on  resource 
exports  locks  these  countries  into  low-growth  underdevelopment.  The 
debate has its  roots  in  dependency theory, and tums on the  question of 
whether resource dependency in  accordance with  presumed comparative 
advantage  imposes systemic disadvantages. Concem at  the  role allotted 
10  the South  under the classical  international division of labour,  from  at 
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early  1970s for a New International  Economic Order to enable countries 
to  escape  from  dependence  on  resource  exports  (Ross  1999).  The 
resource  curse thesis though  did  not  emerge  until  the  aftermath  of the 
1970s global resource boom, when many of the countries that had  gained 
substantial  resource  rents  simultaneously  experienced  surprisingly  low 
economic  growth  rates.  Discussion  of  the  issue  waned  with  the 
depression  in  commodity  prices  in  the  1980s,  but  debate  has  been 
renewed with the resources boom of the  late  1990s and 2000s driven by 
rapid economic  growth  in Asia. 
There  is  broad  agreement  across  the  literature  that,  on  the  basis  of 
country-level data, resource wealth  can be a curse rather than a blessing. 
Three  sets of factors are  cited.  First  there  are  socio-economic  impacts 
arising  from  changing  terms of trade,  weakened  non-resource  sectors, 
income volatility, dominance of foreign-owned resource companies,  lack 
of local  linkages and enclave-formation in what become sharply dualised 
societies,  divided  between  locally-affected  populations  and  resource 
elites.  Second  there  are  political  aspects  stemming  from  the  ready 
availability  of  resource  rents,  especially  in  terms  of  patronage, 
clientelism  and  corruption,  along  with  cross-national  inter-state  and 
corporate  dynam ics that  inter-mesh local  structures with  gee-economic 
pressures  for  resource  access  (see  Lipschutz  ')004).  Third,  there  are 
ecological  impacts,  which  are  visited  upon  immediate  living 
environments in  the first  instance, but extend far beyond immediate sites 
of extraction, through the commodity's life cycle. 
The key debate is not whether these curses exist, but  whether and how 
they  can be avoided (see Ross  1999).  Lead players in  the reformulation 
of neoliberal developmental ism  have weighed  into the debate,  including 
the  World  Bank, arguing that dependence on mining industries should 
not  in principle be of  concern if there are  adequate internal governance 
structures, including exclusively private players in the extraction industry 
(see Lederman and Maloney 2007; Frieden  2006; Humphreys, Sachs and 
Stiglitz  2007).  For the modernizers Australia  is  said to  have  combined 
minerals  dependency  with  prosperity  and,  ironically  enough  for  the 
purposes of this article, is cited as a key example of what can be achieved 
by  an  expanding  minerals  sector  (Wright  and  Czelusta  2007).  Others 
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corporate  power  that  super-accumulate along transnational  commodity 
chains  (Dalby  2004),  and  enable  cross-border  corruption  on  an 
unprecedented scale (Shaxson 2007). This contention over the centrality 
of external  or  internal  factors  is  at  the  core  of the  debate,  reflecting 
broader confrontations in  development studies between dependency and 
modernization models (Davis 1995). 
The Dutch Diseuse 
While  most  discussion  of  the  resource  curse  focuses  on  non-
industrialised  countries,  it  does,  as  noted,  reach  beyond  this  category. 
The main  mechanism  here is what is  referred to as the 'Dutch disease', 
which should  be thought of  as one aspect of the resource curse.  In high-
income countries the disease  is  seen  as  aggravating the process of de-
industrialisation associated with the rise of the  service economy (Palma 
2005). The key  dimension of the disease is the process of displacing or 
crowding-out  non-mining  goods  from  the  export  profile  (Auty  and 
Warhurst  1993). The primary driver is a rising exchange rate that makes 
the  exports  from  local  manufacturing  industries  less  competitive.  The 
term  'Dutch disease' was coined in  1977  by  The  £conomiSI to  describe 
the  experience  in  The Netherlands,  an  industrialised  country  that  from 
the  1960s became dependent on exports of newly-discovered natural gas 
reserves.  The  nation  experienced  a  process  of  accelerated 
deindustrialization through the resource boom  in  the [970s that  led to an 
appreciation  in  the  Guilder,  and  a  reduction  in  manufacturing exports 
(1960-1998). The UK  experience with  the influx of North  Sea Oil  from 
1979 offers a further example - from  1979 to  1984 a deficit in oil exports 
of  £2.2b  became a  surplus of  £6.6b,  followed  by  upward  pressure on 
Sterling  and  a  range  of  deflationary  policies,  transforming  a  £3.6b 
surplus  in  manufacturing  goods  into  a  £6.3b  deficit.  (Palma  2005). 
Oomes and  Ka1cheva (2007: 4) suggest  that  Russia  may  be  the  latest 
example  of  a  developed  country  to  have  suffered  the  Dutch  disease, 
given  the  value of its rapid  increase  in  exports of crude oil  and  natural 
gas since 2000. 
The  onset  of resource  dependency  - or  its  exacerbation  through  a 
resource  boom  - effectively  re-gears  the  economy  to  the  influx  of 
resource-based rents. A rapid rise  in  mining incomes creates inflationary 
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the  cUlling  of  government  social  programs.  While  the  export-based 
mining  industry  may  be  lil1le  affected  by  these policies, their  effect on 
other  industries can  be  extensive.  In  the  UK  for  instance  in  the  1980s, 
manufacturing  employment  declined  by  9.2%,  whereas  the  average 
decl ine  in  the  EU  was only 3.3% (Palma  2005).  The conclusion is  that 
the  disease,  narrowly  interpreted,  simply  sees  a  country  switch  from 
needing  to  generate  a  trade  surplus  in  manufacturing  exports  to  being 
able to rely on a surplus in commodities or services.  Indirect effects then 
extend  into the  broader structure of political decision-making,  with  the 
crowding-out of non-mining  sectors  paralleled  by  the  displacement  of 
mining-affected  communities  and  the  marginal ization  of non-mining 
constituencies, including their corporate elites (Ranis ')006). 
The reorientation  of early  industrialisers such  as the UK is paralleled by 
the  experience of later 'Newly  Industrialised Countries'.  The growth  of 
the  Chinese  economy  through  the  1980s  and  90s,  as  the  world's 
manufacturing workshop, has had a direct effect on late industrialisers in 
the  immediate  East  Asian  region that  have  high resource  endowments. 
Much of the  region has  greatly  increased  its resource  exports to China, 
creating  a  regional  resource  boom  that  has  been  displacing  labour-
intensive  manufacturing.  For example, Australia provides nearly 40% of 
China's iron ore  imports  and  over  60% of Japan's  (Hansard  Western 
Australia  2007a),  Expansion in mining  is accompanied by  expansion  in 
industrial  agriculture, both having the  effect of degrading and denuding 
existing living environments, threatening large-scale resource exhaustion 
(Coxhead 2007). 
But  the  'China  effect'  differs  from  the  earlier  cited  expenences  In 
Holland  and  the  UK  in  being  demand-driven,  The  uniquely  powerful 
model  of Chinese  command  capitalism  threatens  to  transform  the 
regional  'miracles'  into  'curses'.  The  process  is  double-sided,  both 
increasing  the  growth  of extractive  activity  and  under-cutting  existing 
labour-intensive  manufacturing  sectors.  In  terms  of  comparative 
advantage,  such  transformations  are  to  be  welcomed  - they  signal  a 
regional  restructuring  process  that  allows  heightened  concentration  on 
high-output activities, In terms of class dynamics the shifts pose a major 
challenge to livelihoods and  living environments, signalling a race to the 
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be highly spatialised,  both  in  terms of national-level  and  intra-regional 
class  conflicts,  as  unevenness  is  exploited  and  accentuated  by  the 
emergent accumulation model. 
Australian Contexts 
In  2002  there  were  fifty-seven  countries  whose  exports  of fuel  and 
minerals accounted for more then thiny per cent of merchandise expons. 
Only three of the  fifty-seven  were  industrialized countries - Australia, 
Norway and  Canada. Stevens and  Dietsche define these countries as  'at 
risk  of contracting  the  "resource  curse'''.  Given  the  recent  rise  in 
Australia's minerals  and  fuel  exports  10  now  account  for  about 41 per 
cent of merchandise exports, we may speculate that Australia now  holds 
a special status even among those three countries (2008: 59). 
For some,  Australia's  anomalous  international  status  (prosperous and 
resource  dependent)  is  proof of the  potential  benefits  of resource 
dependency. The dominant account of the impact of mining on the wider 
economy  and  society  in  Australia  emphasises  its  beneficial  multiplier 
effects (Cook and  Porter  1984).  In  this respect,  mining  is  seen  as  both 
attracting foreign  investment that would otherwise flow elsewhere and 
providing  windfall  export  earnings  that  supplement  domestic  savings 
rates, enabling heightened  rates of accumulation  (Stevens and  Dietsche 
2008). Official estimates of  the impact of mining on employment tend to 
exaggerate  its  importance.  Inclusion  of  mining  services  increases 
employment effects by about  fifty  percent.  [n  a special report  in  2000 
the ABS went further, estimating direct mining employment at 80,000, or 
1% of total  employment; but almost quadrupling to  325000 or 3.8% of 
the total, with the inclusion of  production and processing, assuming these 
industries  would  not  exist  without  an  extractive  industry  in  Australia 
(ABS 2000a). 
The  Australian  economy  has traditionally  run  a  surplus on  its  primary 
commodities  (agriculture  and  mining)  to  fund  a  deficit  in  its 
manufacturing  trade.  It  is  this  presumed  complementarity  between 
mining and  prosperity that is  cited as Australia's great  lesson.  Indeed, 
the  experience  since  the  1970s  mining  boom,  with  rising  GOP  and THE MINERALS BOOM AND AUSTRALIA'S 'RESOURCE CURSE'  207 
transition to an  information  economy, 'demonstrates that  expansion  of a 
country's mineral  base can go hand-in-hand with economic growth and 
technological  progress'  (Wright  and  Czelusta  2007:  201).  There  is 
optimism that Australian reserves will expand in  the foreseeable future:  it 
is  argued  that  earlier concems  about  exhaustion  (eg  by  the  Club  of 
Rome)  have  been  allayed  by  prospecting  that  has  expanded  known 
reserves.  The industry  is seen  as  up-grading skill levels and generating 
technological  innovation,  including  in  exploration  and  environmental 
clean-up, which are then marketed overseas (Wright and Czelusta 2007). 
Against  these  optimistic  accounts,  other  assessments  of the  1970s 
minerals boom  emphasized the extent to  which  mining would displace 
other activities.  In  an  early intervention,  in  1976, Bob Gregory predicted 
the  process  in  Australia  would  disadvantage  non-mining  sectors, 
especially the rural  sector (Gregory  1976; Cook  and  Porter  1984).  The 
principal  mechanism  for  this  Australian  version of the  'Dutch disease' 
was the exchange rate, which would appreciate with  the mining boom, 
leaving non-mining sectors disadvantaged. Resources would  flow  to the 
mining  sector,  undermining  economic  diversification,  and  leading  to 
macro  mal-development.  The  minerals  boom  was  seen  as  directly 
undermining Australian efforts to strengthen its  manufacturing base and, 
far  from  promoting  prosperity  in  the  medium  term,  it  was  seen  as 
undermining growth  prospects.  With  the onset of a resources boom that 
in  many respects out-booms the 1970s experience, these concems should 
be  revisited  and  revised  in  the  light  of the  now  much  more  clearly 
defined  socio-economic,  political  and  ecological  dimensions  of  the 
process. 
The Boom and Three Curses 
As noted, three broad dimensions of the resource curse can  be  identified 
- socio-economic, political and ecological.  There is evidence of all three 
in  the  Australian  context - with  indications  that  the  mining  boom  is 
sharpening  social  divisions,  that  rentier  corporate  and  govemmental 
practices are on  the  increase, and  that there  is  systemic  mining-related 
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and  correlate,  but  as  outlined  here  they  have  distinct  dynamics  and 
implications. 
Cun'e  I : tle-;fU!uslr;tI!iJitll;O/t tIIu! mcitl/ t/;v;siO/t 
In  terms of the socio-economic dimensions, while  mining  has grown  in 
importance,  manufacturing  has  declined  (Mitchell  and  Bi ll  2006). 
Mining income as a proportion of  GOP has not been as high as it  is today 
since the early part of the  twentieth  century (ABS 2007a). By 2006 the 
boom brought industry income to 7.5 per cent of  GOP, comparing with a 
peak of 15 per cent in  1861  during the gold rush, and 6 per cent during 
the last mining boom  in  1966-1975 (Cook and Porter 1984). 
The  current  resources  boom  is  definitively  export-led.  Prices  of  key 
mining products have been  rising exponentially, primarily as a result of 
increased demand centred on East and South Asia, with US  interventions 
in  the  Middle East and early indications of 'peak oil'  being contributing 
factors.  Between 2004 and 2006 non-rural commodity prices more than 
doubled while rural  prices remained static (Mitchell and Bill 2006). As a 
result,  mining exports  have  been  increasingly significant:  minerals and 
fuels together accounted for 27 per cent of goods and services exports in 
1968, rising to  39  per cent  in 2002,  and  reaching 43  per cent  in  2007 
(OF A  T 2007  and  ABS 2007d).  In contrast with  the  1970s, agricultural 
exports  have  been  either  static  or  falling  (Harris  and  Taylor  1982). 
Manufacturing  exports  have  increased  but  not  as  rapidly:  mining 
produced  an  increase  in  primary  exports  from  $77.7b.  in  2002  to 
$102.4b.  in  2007 whereas  manufacturing exports rose from $35.2b.  to 
$44b. over the same period. 
The  picture  in  the  internationally  traded  sector  is  reflected  across  the 
board: on the overall index of industrial  production mining has grown 5.7 
per cent  since 2004 while manufacturing has grown  1.7 per cent  (which 
includes a  14  point increase  in  non-metallic minerals processing)  (ABS 
2007d).  Employment  in  the  mining  industry,  reflecting  its  capital-
intensity, has never been  commensurate with  its  importance to  GOP or 
trade,  but  it  has  risen  in  recent  years.  In  2001  total  employment  in  the 
extractive  industries stood at 83000, or 1 per cent of the  total, rising to 
136,000  by  2007,  with  the  key  driver being  coal  mining.  [n  contrast, 
manufacturing  employment  actually  fell,  from  [087,000  in  2004  to 
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Perhaps most significant, though, is the impact of  the resources boom on 
investment  flows.  Investment  into  the  industry  has  been  growing.  In 
2004-05 private new capital expenditure in mining stood at $10.2b. or  18 
per cent of the  total for  Australia.  In  2005-06,  this  almost  doubled  to 
$22b. or 29 per cent of the total, which compares with a peak of 13.6 per 
cent during the  1966-75 mining boom (Harris and Taylor 1982). Most of 
this  increased investment was  in  coal, oil  and gas - key energy sources, 
and key contributors to greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. This influx of 
capital is  either coming from  other Australian economic sectors or it  is 
coming from  international finance markets.  In both cases impacts on the 
non-mining sector are  negative.  The first starves non-mining sectors of 
investment  funds,  while  the  second  has  an  indirect  effect  through  an 
appreciating  exchange  rate  and  through  in flationary  pressures  in  the 
wider economy. 
With  manufacturing stagnant and the rural  sector  in  decline the mining 
boom, both  in  tenns of increased export value and increased  inflows of 
capital,  most  reasonably  explains  the  recent  appreciation  in  the 
Australian dollar exchange rate.  The rate rose by  14  per cent against 
the  Yen  and  11  per  cent  against  the  US$  between  2004  and  2006 
(Mitchell and  Bill  2006). That influence has an  impact on the rest of the 
economy, especially  for  sectors  sensitive to  exchange rate appreciation 
and,  as the  mining  boom  generates  inflationary  pressures,  to  resulting 
interest rate rises.  Given  unprecedented rates of indebtedness across the 
country (M itchell and Bill  2006) and, given the concentration of mining 
incomes  in  specific enclaves, the  spatial  impacts are highly uneven and 
divisive. 
At the micro level mining creates deeply divided communities. Mining in 
Australia is often located away from  the metropoles on Crown Land that 
in  practical  tenns  remains  the  domain  of indigenous  owners.  Mining 
operations  necessarily  involve  the  displacement  of such  native  title 
claims.  In some contexts indigenous groups have been able to  exercise 
negotiation  rights,  and  have  secured  compensation  in  terms of royalty 
flows,  service  provision  and  employment  (Kaufmann  1998).  In  other 
contexts  indigenous groups have  been played ofT one against another to 
secure  mining  rights,  directly  undermining  community  capacity  (an 
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created  at  the  BHP  Billiton  Olympic  Dam  uranium  mme  m  South 
Australia;  see  Doyle  2002).  While  displacing  and  disadvantaging 
indigenous owners,  mining operations at  the  same time benefit  a small 
workforce  and  managerial  elite,  often  co-located  in  company-owned 
enclaves  in  the  vicinity  of mining  operations.  The  survival  of these 
enclaves depends on  the continued operation of the  mine,  and  thereby 
creates a  local  corporate-aligned constituency.  A  good  example  is  the 
town of Jabiru  in  the Northern  Territory, which  houses workers  for  the 
nearby  Ranger uranium  mine.  Indigenous owners of the  land  on  which 
mineworkers  live  and  work  inhabit  lands  abutting  the  mine,  and  have 
entered  into  long-running  disputes  to  prevent  expansion  of the  mine 
operations (Goodman 2007). 
Local divisions  are  replicated  at  the  national  level,  with  sharp  spatial 
divides between mining-dependent and manufacturing-focused states and 
territories.  In Australia 45  per cent of mining income and 37  per cent of 
mining  employment  is  concentrated  in  Western  Australia.  While,  as 
noted, mining contributes approximately 7.5  per cent ofGDP, in  WA  it 
contributes  27  per  cent  (in  2005-06;  ABS  2007c).  In  2007  the  West 
Australian Treasurer reported that 'Growth in  WA's gross state product is 
about double the national average. In 2006-07, our economy grew by 6.3 
per  cent.. ..  The  national  economy  grew  by  3.2  per  cent.'  (Hansard 
Western Australia 2007b). The WA  Commodity price index increased 20 
per cent in just one year, June 2006- June 2007 (Department of  Treasury 
and Finance 2007: 84).  Major planned projects in  Western Australia are 
mainly resource-based and totaled $140  billion in  late 2007 (Department 
of  Treasury and Finance 2007: 54). 
While  some  States,  WA  included,  become  more  deeply  dependent  on 
world  minerals  markets,  for  other  States  which  are  more  reliant  on 
manufacturing  and  services  the  national  mining  boom  can  be  highly 
destabilizing.  Just  as  mining  creates  dualisms  at  the  local  level,  so  it 
creates what has been  characterized as  the 'two-speed economy' at  the 
national level (M itchell and Bill 2006). Given  the spatial concentration of 
employment  patterns,  this  can  create  major  problems  in  terms  of 
deindustrialised  neighbourhoods,  creating  ingrained  inequalities  within 
States.  Despite the broader national  context of financial  boom  and  low 
unemployment,  Mitchell  and  Bill  chart  some  of the  more  vulnerable THE MINERALS BOOM AND AUSTRALIA'S 'RESOURCE CURSE'  211 
neighbourhoods  in  NSW, most particularly  in  the  West of Sydney,  that 
are likely to be most negatively affected  by  the advancing disruption of 
manufacturing employment  under the resource boom (Mitchell  and  Bill 
2006). 
CUT!ie 2: regulatory cupture (l1U1  'el/ergy!ieC'tlTity' 
Political dimensions  overlap  with  these  socio-economic  dynamics,  but 
are broader in  scope. Government policy  during the  minerals boom  has 
been  deliberately  facilitative  of expansion. The  1998  Resources  Policy 
Statement  set  the  framework  for  the  up-coming  boom,  offering  an 
emphasis on certainty in  tenns of  property rights especially in  relation to 
native  title  rights,  competitiveness  in  tenns of offering  tax  incentives, 
promoting a  self-regulatory  approach  to  environmental protection,  and 
acting internationally as an  industry advocate and deal-maker at  bilateral 
and multilateral contexts (see Mercer 2000). The approach has involved 
an active deregulation of indigenous land rights, especially in relation to 
rights  to  negotiate,  through  the  1998  amendments  to  the  1993  Native 
Title  Act,  and  the  creation  of  voluntary  codes  such  as  through  the 
'Minerals Industry Code of Practice for environmental management' and 
the  'Greenhouse  Challenge'.  The  1998  statement  thus  affirmed  the 
capture  of Australian  Federal  policy  by  the  mining  industry,  to  the 
detriment of other sectors and to subordinates,  including mining-affected 
communities, 
Even  within the  framework of existing resources policy, a key  political 
question  is  the  extent  to  which  mining  rents are distributed  for  public 
benefit.  Unlike  most  other  resource-dependent  countries,  Australia  did 
not  nationalize  its  extraction  industry  in  the  1960s and  70s,  so  this  is 
primarily  an issue of taxation.  Mining in  Australia involves a variety of 
royalty regimes administered by State governments, in addition  to federal 
taxes.  Other  countries - Norway  and  Botswana  among  them  - have 
established  savings  funds for mining rents so as to  ensure revenues are 
used  in  the  long  tenn  interest  of  the  populace (Stevens  and  Dietsche 
2008).  These  schemes  are  designed  to  prevent  the  waste  of  windfall 
rents, the  rationale being  that, once extracted, mineral  wealth  is  lost  to 
future generations, a secondary consideration being the desire to insulate 
the  national  economy  from  the  volatility  of  commodity  markets. 
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spend  the  windfall  as  it  passes  through  the  tax  office.  Neither  has 
Australia instituted a specific regime of taxation, beyond limited  royalty 
payments, to access rising rents during boom times. 
It  may  once  have  been  argued  that  a  relatively  generous  tax  system 
rewards  locally-based  mining  industry,  and  thus  benefits  the  local 
economy.  Today, though, Australia has little to speak of in  tenns of an 
indigenously·owned  mining  industry.  In fact, the  industry  is  so  clearly 
concentrated  in  the  hands  of  a  small  number  of  transnationalised 
corporations  that  it  makes  little  sense  to  refer  to  it  as  an  Australian 
industry as  such. There was a period in Australian mining history when 
multinational  mining  corporations,  sensitive to  local  concerns,  ensured 
their entities were majority·owned in  Australia (Harris and Taylor 1982). 
For many years,  for  instance,  Rio Tinto  maintained  only a 49  per cent 
share of  the 'big Australian', BHP. Since the late  1980s such sensitivities 
at  governmental  level  have subsided,  such that  in  2001  BHP  could  be 
merged with  the  international  mining giant,  Billiton, with  no  objections 
from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission or from  the 
advisory  Australian  Foreign  Investment  Review  Board  (Costello 2001). 
In  late 2007, with the proposed  merger between  BHP  Billiton  and  Rio 
Tinto,  we were presented  with the situation of the Chinese Government 
raising concerns about the monopsony power this might create, while the 
ACCC  and  the  Australian  Government,  faced  with  the  prospect  of  a 
monopolized mining sector, signaled acquiescence (Alberici 2007), 
Not  surprisingly  Australia's  privately-owned,  low·taxed,  oligopolised 
and transnationalised mining sector has been  in a position to retain  much 
of its  windfall  gains  under the  resources  boom.  The routine process of 
transnational  profit  sheltering  and  tax  minimization  ensures  the  rents 
accrue  to  the  corporates,  not  to  the  government  (Shaxson  2007).  The 
returns have been substantial.  With  the  rise  in  commodity  prices, there 
has been a dramatic increase in  the value of mining exports,  and this has 
more than doubled pre-tax mining profit, from  $13b. in 2001-02 to $21 b. 
in  2004-05,  and  $33.4b.  in  2005·06.  Reflecting  the  structure  of the 
mining  industry  in  Australia, much  of that  profit has  been  retained  by 
companies.  The total  tax-take for minerals and oil  and  gas actually  fell 
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for  oil  and  gas) to $8.6b. ($3.lb.  for  minerals,  $5.5b.  for oil  and gas) 
(ABS 2007b). 
Lacking  any  plans  for  retaining  windfall  tax  gains  from  mining,  the 
Federal  Government  has  made  extensive  political  use  of the  funds  to 
shore  up  its  flagging  support  through  extensive  tax  cuts.  One  may 
speculate on the  extent  to  which  windfall  tax gains, dating  back  to  the 
early 2000's,  enabled a  relatively  unpopular Coalition government to 
remain  in  power  for  eleven  years,  John  Howard's  longevity  as  Prime 
Minister  was  surely  in  some  significant  degree  attributable  to  his 
government's  largesse  in  terms  of  recurring  budget  surpluses  and  tax 
cuts.  The  impact  has  been  particularly  highlighted  in  recent  years  as 
Australia's special  circumstances  have  seen  it  del inked  from  the  US-
centred  economic  cycle:  in  late  2007  the  USA  was  in  a  deflationary 
phase,  with  falling  interest  rates,  while  in  Australia  inflat ion  had 
broached  the  Reserve  Bank's  2-3  per  cent  target  range,  and  further 
interest rate rises took  place.  In  2008 the dual  economy has come home 
to  roost,  with  the  incoming  Labor  Government  stymied  between  a 
booming  mining  sector  and  an  increasingly  recessionary  non-mining 
economy. 
The  pol itical  curses  of resource  dependence  are  also  played  out  in 
international contexts.  Rivalry to maintain resource streams - in terms of 
resource  markets  as  well  as  supplies - feeds  directly  into  international 
conflicts  and  geo-economics  (Dalby  2004).  In  the  Australian  case the 
reliance  on  Asian  markets  for  mining  exports  draws  the  Australian 
government  into a range of regional deal-making structures.  Australia's 
two  top  exports - coal  and  iron  ore - are  primarily  focused on Asian 
markets, with 4 I percent of coal exports going to Japan, and 54  per cent 
of  iron  ore  destined  for  China  (DFAT 2007c).  In  196541  per  cent  of 
mining exports were destined  for Europe, 41 per cent  to Asia; while by 
1999  the  proportion  destined for  Europe  had  fallen to  14  per cent,  the 
proportion  to  Asia  stood  at  to  64  per  cent  (ABS  2000a).  The  recent 
resource boom  has accentuated  links to the region, placing a premium on 
securing trade deals and resource supply contracts. Such efforts centre on 
striking  side  agreements  regarding  the  supply  of Australian  mineral 
resources, often as part of wider trade negotiations.  For example a deal 
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Chinese  gas  markets  for  Australia  (ABC  News  2007).  The  trade 
agreements, meanwhile, have the prospect of  further exposing Australia-
based  manufacturing  to  regional  competition,  accentuating 
manufacturing import dependence. 
At the  same  time, concerns  for 'energy security' drive much more direct 
forms of  intervention  (see  Le Billon  2005).  Reflecting the  relationship 
between  mineral wealth and political rivalry (Fairhead  2001), a range of 
conflicts have emerged  in  the mineral-rich  'arc of  instability' north of 
Australia.  Australia  has played  an  active  role  in  that  arc,  deliberately 
seeking  to  shore-up  the  regional  interests  of  Australia-based  mining 
companies.  An obvious example in this context is the Australian military 
blockade of the  island of  Bougainville after local insurgents closed down 
a BHP mine in  1989 - at the time one of the world's largest copper mines 
(as  discussed  in  Le  Billon  2005).  A  more  recent  example  is  the 
Australian  diplomatic  and  military relationship  with  East  Timor,  both 
before  East  Timor's independence and  after, which has revolved around 
Australian access to oil and gas reserves in the Timor Sea (Cleary 2007). 
There are other equally revealing cases, complementing broader regional 
and bilateral efforts at shoring-up Australian 'energy security' in terms of 
access  to  resources  and  markets  in  the  region  (Chan,  Goodman  and 
O'Connor 2006). 
Cunie 3: ecological (legrrulafiofl all(/ exlUlusfiOlt 
Finally,  and  perhaps  most  importantly,  is  the  question  of  ecological 
curses.  Extracted mineral  and  fuel resources are unique in the sense that 
they  cannot  be  replaced:  they  are  a  non-renewable  endowment  rather 
than a renewable asset.  Once extracted they  are  lost (Slack 2004). The 
process  of  extraction necessarily affects current  and  future generations, 
whether through  its  impact  on ancestral  domain, community patrimony 
or the  global commons.  The unique character of  mineral resources, and 
of  the  living environments in  which  they  are  deposited,  renders their 
value  incommensurable, effectively priceless.  They cannot  therefore be 
reduced  to  the cash  nexus - which can  never adequately  reflect  their 
value.  As Slack puts it, resource extraction 'goes beyond typical debates 
over  the  relative  merits of different economic models,  reaching  to  the 
heart  of  the  long-term  viability of life  on  earth'  (2004:14).  For  these 
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mineral  resources  for the  good of the  peoples and the  environments  in 
which they live, 
These  qualitative  aspects  of  mmmg  are  played  out  in  multiple 
dimensions, but  perhaps the  most important  is  the dimension of climate 
change.  The impacts of climate change,  predicted  for  more than  three 
decades (see  Harris and Taylor  1982), are  most clearly felt  in  resource 
dependent regions where climate change is rendering existing economic 
activity unviable. Clear examples already evident  include tourism  on the 
Great Barrier Reef, winter skiing in  the Snowy Mountains, and  farming 
communities directly affected by drought and rising temperatures. 
The  minerals  sector  and  especially  the  energy  sector  has  a  particular 
impact on  GHG  emissions.  The  impact  is  at  least  three-fold.  First  are 
emissions  associated  with  the  process  of extraction  and  processing. 
Second  is the impact  felt through  the domestic consumption of minerals 
and fuels.  Third is the impact  of GHG emissions released as a result  of 
the consumption of energy exports or the upstream processing of exports 
such  as  iron ore.  Much  of  Australia's  mining  exports  are  driven  by 
export-orientated manufacturing industry  in  the Asian  region. Australian 
raw materials playa role  in  the  manufacture  of consumer durables and 
other  manufactured  commodities  that  find  their  way  from  Chinese, 
Indian  and  Japanese  factories  into  Australian  households.  During  the 
boom the Australian economy is thus  doubly advantaged, selling mining 
commodities in  return  for cheap manufactures: in neither respect, though, 
are  the  GHG  emissions  associated  with  the  lifecycle  of the  exported 
minerals attributed to the Australian economy, 
Emissions  directly  released  through  extraction  and  processing  are 
relatively easily calculated, at  31  million metric tonnes (mmt), or about 5 
per cent of Australia's total  emissions of 559  mmt  in  2005;  emissions 
directly associated with the burning of fuels for energy in Australia stood 
at  278  mmt, or 50  per cent  of total  emissions (DCC 2007).  Emissions 
produced from  the offshore burning or processing of  Australian minerals 
- notably coal, iron  ore, gas and oil  - are harder to calculate. Under the 
Cl imate Change Convention GHG emissions are attributed to the country 
of  emission,  not  to  the  country  of extraction,  so  Australia's  'offshore' 
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Figures  can  be  developed  though,  for  individual  commodities  such  as 
coal,  especially  significant  as  Australia,  with  30  per  cent  of global 
exports, is the world's largest coal exporter (Australian Coal Association 
2008).  In  2005-2006 for  instance, Australia exported 233  million tonnes 
of  coal. Estimates of  the average ratio for emissions from  a tonne of coal 
vary from  2.4, as calculated by the Australian Greenhouse Office, to 2.1 , 
as estimated by  the United Sates Environment  Protection  Agency (DCC 
2008;  USEPA 2008).  Taking the more optimistic US  EPA estimate this 
means  Australia's  coal  exports  in  2005  produced  490  mmt  of GHG 
emissions.  Limiting  the  estimate  to  domestic  mining  and  energy,  and 
adding coal exports, the industry produces a total of 780  mmt, or about 
140 per cent of the Australian total. 
Resource dependence has  locked Australia into  carbon-intensive energy 
production.  Domestically, between  1973  and 2000 emissions per unit of 
output  in  the  Australian  mining and energy  sector  increased  by  3.5  per 
cent, in  contrast with  all  other sectors which either reduced or stabilised 
their  emissions  intensity.  Meanwhile,  reliance  on  coal  for  electricity 
increased from  48  per cent to 55 per of total output, ensuring that the rate 
of emissions  per  unit  of electricity  remained  hardly  changed  in  thirty 
years. 
In  2003  the  Government's own research  agency,  ABARE,  investigated 
the  issue and  found  total  C02 emissions  from  fossil  fuel  combustion 
increasing  at  much  the  same  rate  as  energy  consumption  levels.  Its 
conclusion  - important  given  the  large-scale  improvements  in  energy 
production  technologies over the same twenty-seven  year  period  - was 
that 'the carbon intensity of  energy use was unaITected overall by energy 
sector developments,  when  comparing end  points  of the  study  period' 
(ABARE 2003: 57).  We may count this as an  indirect cost of the mining 
industry,  in terms of cheap coal  and gas.  For the climate, and thus  for 
society as a whole, cheap minerals supply in  Australia is truly a curse. 
Conclusions 
The  resource  curse  appears  to  be  alive  and  well  in  Australia's  latest 
resource  boom.  Socio-economic  dimensions  of displacement  and  de-THE MINERALS BOOM AND AUSTRALIA'S 'RESOURCE CURSE'  217 
industrialisation  are  evident,  with  socia-spatial  divides  deepening  at 
local,  inter-state and  international scales.  Likewise,  there are  powerful 
pol itical dynamics at  play that favour rentier corporate elites - especially 
through tax minimization - and encourage concomitant fOnTIS of political 
patronage,  along with  international  rivalries  and  connicts.  Finally,  the 
Australian  resource  curse  fO nTIS part  of  the  broader  global  'curse'  of 
climate change, which threatens now to erode the viability of not simply 
other  sectors  of  the  economy  but  of  the  entire  society.  If we  are  to 
address  these systentic dynamics  then  we must seriously  question  the 
current resource boom . 
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